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Legal ramifications of Zong massacre

Published:Sunday | December 18, 2022 | 1:29 AM
The Zong plaque  which was  unveiled in Black River on December 28 to remember the 133 Africans  who were thrown from the British slave ship, Zong, in 1781. The ship docked in Black River on December 28, 1781.
The Zong plaque which was unveiled in Black River on December 28 to remember the 133 Africans who were thrown from the British slave ship, Zong, in 1781. The ship docked in Black River on December 28, 1781.

On December 28, 1781, a Dutch ship, Zorgue, bought by a Liverpool Syndicate and renamed Zong, docked in Black River, Jamaica, where it disembarked 208 of the originally forcibly embarked 442 enslaved Africans from what is today Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.

On this journey, 10 African men jumped to their death, and 122 were deliberately drowned by the crew. As we approach another anniversary of what is now known as the Zong massacre, Professor Verene Shepherd (VS) spoke with Priscellia Robinson (PR), barrister-at-law and PhD law and social sciences student about the legal ramifications of this terrible tragedy in global history.

VS: When did you first become aware of the Zong massacre?

PR: While completing my Master’s in International Transport and Maritime Law, my lecturer mentioned a case called Gregson v Gilbert (1783) 3 Doug. KB 232. I did not pay much attention to it until I heard, “Jamaica, St Elizabeth, slavery, and March 6, 1783”. I immediately became interested. As I am a descendant of the Windrush generation, African chattel slavery is very close to my heart. Furthermore, my great-grandmother, Caroline James-Robinson, the sister of late Prime Minister Donald Sangster, was from Black River, St Elizabeth, so it is my home parish. Now the date, March 6, the date the first Zong trial took place in London, also, my birthday, is cemented in my consciousness.

VS: Why did this case become of interest to the legal community?

PR: First, there is the timing of the case. Prior to 1783, various tests cases surrounding the legalities of African chattel slavery had taken place under English law. For a while, the legal community had endured the metamorphosis of the “trover” principle in law, which, at first, held that Africans were infidels, therefore, property ( Butts v Penny [1677] 2 Lev 201). Later, it was held that Africans were no longer chattel but their rights were limited to that of a villein ( Chamberlain v Harvey (1696) 5 Mod.187). There was the Yorke-Talbot Slavery Opinion of 1729, which was extremely influential. It concluded that any enslaved person coming from the West Indies to Britain was not automatically free upon arrival and could be returned to the plantation. Second, Lord Mansfield presided over this case. He was renowned for his reform of English law and had previously presided over the famous Somerset case (Somerset v Stewart (1772) 98 ER 499), which determined that African chattel slavery had never been authorised by statute within England and Wales, and was unsupported within England by common law. Lastly, where a case has been appealed, there will always be legal interest.

VS: Can you explain the legal ramifications of the case and the subsequent appeal?

PR: The initial trial focused on whether the insurance underwriters, namely Gilbert, should pay Gregson, the Liverpool slavery syndicate, a sum of £3,660. The issue at trial was whether the act of throwing enslaved Africans overboard due to a lack of water supplies was an “absolute necessity” to save the others, all of whom were deemed to be, by law, cargo. Despite being shocked by the facts of the case, the jury found that it was the most appropriate manner for the cause. An appeal arose because insurers and others felt that not only had murder been committed, but Gregson was allowed to glorify in the infamy and received a reward for it (Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser 1783). The appeal in May 1783, heard both sides’ perspective on the massacre of enslaved Africans; however this time Lord Mansfield focused on the Zong’s Policy of Insurance. The issue before the court was whether there was an “Absolute Necessity” to dispose of the “cargo” or whether it was due to human error. What was different from the initial trial was that new evidence emerged revealing that the last group of 38 enslaved Africans were thrown overboard a day after it rained. This equalled a potential replenishment of water supplies. Lord Mansfield concluded that based upon this new evidence, only a retrial could ascertain “Absolute Necessity”. The appeal resulted in Gregson never receiving any insurance payout as no retrial was advanced.

VS: During the period of the Transatlantic trafficking in enslaved Africans, this practice was not unusual, and the evidence brought by defence provides detailed explanations, so why did the appeal succeed?

PR: New evidence brought during the appeal discredited Gregson’s legal team’s argument that the Africans “perished just as a cargo of goods perished”, and the killings constituted a sensible jettisoning of objects. Gilbert’s legal team argued that the mass murder was due to a human error and no “such necessity could justify such a very extraordinary transaction”. Looking at the evidence, if it rained the day before the last thirty-eight enslaved Africans were thrown overboard, then I guess the court would have concluded that the water must have been replenished. Only a retrial could ascertain whether the water was enough for both the crew members and the remaining enslaved Africans. This uncertainty meant that a retrial would have been required. I think another reason was the lack of key witnesses. Many crew members, including the captain, had subsequently died; the other surviving enslaved Africans had been sold; and the only witness, namely a passenger, claimed not to have seen the massacre.

VS: Why was this case so groundbreaking, especially as it pertains to the abolitionist movement of the time?

PR: The abolition movement at the time was equivalent to Black Lives Matter and reparatory justice movements that we see today. Influential and well-respected abolitionists Olaudah Equiano, Ottobah Cugoano, and Granville Sharp lobbied for justice in this case. For them, this was a case of moral justice versus commercial law and an opportunity to showcase the massacre of hundreds of African human beings as murder. The case weakened the normalisation to dehumanise Africans and strengthen the moral compass within British society. Further, there was a hope that a prosecution of Gregson for murder may have been advanced.

VS: Do you believe that the global community has done enough to memorialise the victims? If not, what more can be done?

PR: No, not at all. We should make the studying of the case of the Zong compulsory within the educational curriculum in Britain and the Caribbean. Further, annually, we should hold a collaborative memorial service in Ghana, Britain, and Jamaica.

VS: Do the legalities of the Zong case have any bearing on the case for reparation today?

PR: From a perspective of reparatory justice and the need for repair, yes. This case demonstrates, historically, the English law’s complicit nature to support African chattel slavery via the use of discriminatory laws and legal practices. Today, the application of British law and policies are applied in the same discriminatory way, resulting in outcomes which adversely affect people of African descent living in and travelling/migrating to Britain. The Zong conveys the continued legacy of African chattel slavery in that people of African descent are still not treated equally simply due to the colour of their skin.

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