Editorial | Alter finance minister rule

Kristalina Georgieva’s recruitment of Nigel Clarke as one of her deputies at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has spawned something of a spectator sport in Kingston: everyone is guessing about who will replace Dr Clarke as Jamaica’s finance minister.

So far, few people seem to think that Prime Minister Andrew Holness has anyone on the government benches in the House of Representatives with the capacity to do the job. Dr Clarke’s imminent departure therefore raises another important issue that ought to be urgently placed on the agenda for constitutional reform: the stipulation that the finance minister has to be a member of the House.

This newspaper believes that should be changed.

The Constitution, at Section 77 (1), gives the governor general, “ acting in accordance with the advice of the prime minister”, the authority to appoint a minister from the House and Senate, except that in the case of the latter, ministers appointed from that chamber are exempt from responsibilities that “may be inconsistent with any minister function under Section 67, 115,116 or 118 of this Constitution”.

Section 115 says: “ The minister responsible for finance shall, before the end of each fiscal year, cause to be prepared annual estimates of revenue and expenditure for public services during the succeeding financial year, which shall be laid before the House of Representatives ...”

Section 116 deals with the finance minister’s obligations to present annual appropriation bills and, if required, supplementary estimates to Parliament, while Section 118 covers his authority to make advance to contingency funds and to report these to the legislature. The obvious interpretation of these sections is that anyone who enjoys such powers over taxpayers’ money must be an elected member of the House of Representatives, rather than an appointee from the Senate.

The Gleaner appreciates the conceptual framework of this stipulation. The framers supposed that an elected member of the legislature inherently carried greater accountability. That person could be turfed out by electors if he or she failed to perform to their satisfaction. Indeed, it is a continuation, at the individual level, of the principle that requires money bills to originate in the House and gives the Senate limited power over these types of legislation.

SENATE, PRIMARILY A REVIEW CHAMBER

Dr Clarke himself was a member of the Senate before he replaced Audley Shaw, in 2018, as the finance minister. A seat had to be found for him in the House to formally get the job.

The Senate is primarily a review chamber, tending to be more deliberative than the often more sharply partisan House. Dr Clarke, during his tenure, was considered among its most thoughtful and deliberative members. He might have since lost much of the gloss from his political halo, although he has burnished his reputation as a fiscally responsible finance minister who has strengthened Jamaica’s macroeconomic stability and reduced its debt as a proportion of GDP.

Indeed, even his critics recognise his competence in that respect and the difficulties that Prime Minister Holness was likely to have finding a replacement, if that person were to come from the governing Jamaica Labour Party’s (JLP) cadre in the House.

It has been speculated that he could possibly call on Don Wehby, the government senator, who is CEO of the GraceKennedy conglomerate. Mr Wehby once acted as a minister without portfolio in the finance ministry without having the top job and the legal responsibilities that come with it.

Or, he might opt for Dana Morris Dixon, a senator and former banker and university lecturer, who is now the minister of communications and digital transformation. Another reported prospect is Alok Jain, a highly respected chartered accountant, who is one of Mr Holness’ close advisers.

DEEPLY ENTRENCHED CLAUSE

The problem with appointing any of these persons, and overlooking Fayval Williams, the education minister (who was previously a minister in the ministry of finance), is that the selectee would first have to have a seat in the House. Yet, more than most portfolios in the government, the ministry is time-consuming.

It demands a minister (if he is to do the job right) who is intellectually and technically sound and having great integrity. And in some respects stubborn, too.

It is against this background that we believe the Constitution should be amended to allow finance ministers to be also named from the Senate. Proposals to increase the number of senators from 21 to 27 would make this even more viable.

Section 77 of the Constitution, on its face, appears not to be a deeply entrenched clause, which would mean that it could be amended with a vote of a simple majority of all members of parliament. However, sections 67, 116 and 118 are, thus requiring that any bills to amend them have to sit on the table of Parliament for three months before being debated, and a similar period after the debate before being voted on. They also have to be passed with two-third majorities.

There are likely to be questions of whether those sections are to be read with Section 77, making any amendment part of a single scheme, thus making any alteration of the powers in Section 77 a more problematic process. These are issues that should be urgently placed on the constitutional reform agenda. For, whatever mechanism may be needed for doing so, the current requirement that the finance minister can come only from the House is impatient for change.