Aubrey Stewart | Evaluating state of public emergency in Jamaica

For months, I’ve followed public discourse across social media, political commentary, and academic circles on the effectiveness of the state of public emergency (SOE) and other crime-control policies in Jamaica.

Unfortunately, much of this conversation is dominated by speculation and a romanticism with subjective opinion, often supported only by descriptive or anecdotal evidence. This is cause for concern. Without clear, rigorous experimentation and peer-reviewed research to guide public understanding of government policies, misinformation and misinterpretation can spread easily. Even when strong evidence is available, some still choose to ignore it. For this reason, our efforts must be clear, constructive, and firmly grounded in data. This is why it is important to contribute to the conversation. In addition, Crime, arguably Jamaica’s most pressing issue, should never be reduced to political point-scoring or one-sided selected outrage.

It requires a unified approach and a deliberate commitment to understanding the evidence through sound, experimental crime policy evaluation, rooted in the interest of the people.

TURNING TO EVIDENCE

Over the past four years, my doctoral research has evaluated major crime prevention policies across the Caribbean. The focus has been on using modern statistical techniques to assess real-world problems, including the impact of weather on crime, sports programming and violence reduction, and more recently, the SOE. Some of this work has been published in World Bank Economic Review and the Journal of Sports Economics. In two forthcoming papers, one co-authored with colleagues at Florida International University, titled “From crisis to control: are state of emergency interventions a short-term fix to crime in Jamaica?”, and another with a colleague from the University of the West Indies, titled “Testing deterrence through states of emergency: A quasi-experimental evaluation of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago” set out to answer five key questions:

1. How effective are SOEs in reducing crime in treated police divisions?

2. Do SOEs lead to increased arrest rates of targeted offenders?

3. Do SOEs cause crime to spill over into surrounding areas?

4. Are the effects of SOEs sustained after they end?

5. What is the impact of repeated SOEs in the same divisions?

I will focus on the first three.

DO SOEs REDUCE CRIME?

To evaluate whether SOEs reduce crime in the short term, we used a method temporal regression discontinuity design. Imagine you’re trying to see if turning on a fan actually cools down a room. You take the temperature just before switching on the fan and then again right after, making sure no windows were opened, or other changes were made in the meantime. That way, you can be more confident that any drop in temperature is because of the fan and not something else.

In the same way, we measured crime just before and just after the SOE in each area, carefully isolating the effect of the SOE from anything else that could have influenced crime. The analysis spans SOE declarations across multiple police divisions in Jamaica between 2017 and 2024.The findings show on average, SOEs resulted in a reduction of 0.10 total crimes per 1,000 residents, representing a 45.5 per cent decrease relative to the pre-SOE baseline. This decline was primarily driven by significant reductions in violent crime: murders fell by 59.7 per cent, and shootings declined by 47.5 per cent. These results strongly suggest that the imposition of SOEs can have an immediate and measurable impact on curbing violent crime.

To assess whether these findings hold in other contexts, we replicated the same evaluation framework in Trinidad and Tobago, which has also implemented SOEs in response to surges in violent crime. The results were strikingly similar. Within the first 90 days of SOE implementation, crime rates in Trinidad and Tobago dropped by an average of 0.023 incidents per 1,000 population, corresponding to a 33 per cent reduction in total crime and a 50 per cent reduction in violent crime. These consistent outcomes across two distinct but comparable Caribbean countries enhance the external validity of the findings and provide important regional insight into the potential of SOEs as a short-term crime control tool.

ARREST RATES AND DISPLACEMENT

One frequent concern about SOEs is that they result in indiscriminate or excessive arrests. However, the data tells a different story. Arrest rates for major crimes did not rise significantly during SOE periods. Instead, many criminal actors appeared to “lie low,” minimising their movements to avoid apprehension for crimes they have committed. This behavioural change likely contributed to the observed drop in violent crime.

We also found little evidence of displacement where crime shifts from one area to another. Rather than relocating their activities to untreated communities, many offenders seemed to withdraw entirely, suggesting a short-term deterrent effect. Beyond suppression, SOEs also enhanced law enforcement’s ability to map and monitor criminal networks, particularly gangs and white-collar collaborators. This intelligence-gathering function, though often overlooked, is one of the most strategic and lasting benefits of emergency powers, forming the foundation for more targeted interventions like focused deterrence.

FUTURE OF SOEs

The data confirms, when used judiciously, SOEs can be an effective tool for reducing crime in the short term. But they are not a substitute for long-term crime prevention or community development. SOEs should not become routine policy. Their value lies in their ability to support broader strategies, for instance the use of focused deterrence efforts including, surveillance, and community policing, during extraordinary crises.

Without social investment, institutional reform, and trust-building in vulnerable communities, no emergency power can deliver sustainable public safety. Policymakers, public servants, and law enforcement officials deserve credit for crafting and executing interventions. But as researchers, we must hold ourselves to the highest standard of evidence: testing, validating, and informing decisions that affect real people in real time. That is the only way forward.

Aubrey Stewart, PhD, is a public policy researcher and consultant. Send feedback to astew055@fiu.edu and highlightsresearch@gmail.com