Changing balance in the Middle East

Anyone who still labours under the conception that the Arab world comprises a bunch of hot-headed Muslims who need strong governments to keep them in line should read the 2004 novel, The Yacoubian Building. Written by Alaa al-Aswany, the book went on to enjoy huge success throughout the Middle East. It captures the complexity and lively society of present-day Egypt, and the decadent regime under which its people toll.

It is a salutary reminder of the mistakes of basing policy on oversimplified understandings of a region and its people. As one Egyptian intellectual wrote caustically the other day, Arabs have for long listened to other people tell them they needed strong governments to stave off anarchy. Now, they are making their own voices heard.

Just where it will all lead, nobody can say with confidence. The assessment changes by the day. The wave of protest against authoritarian governments in North Africa and the Middle East is not only providing for good copy. It is profoundly altering the balance of power in the Middle East in ways that will take some time to become clear.

United States (US) foreign policy has, for decades, been premised on the pillars of standing by Israel, supporting Egypt, maintaining good relations with oil-exporting states and containing Iran. These policy goals often produced inevitable tensions: the hostility of much of the Arab world to Israel created obvious contra-dictions in a policy that tried to placate all; the outcome, though, was that the US forged close ties with authoritarian regimes that repressed the popular hostility towards Israel.

Costly irony

This created an opening for Iran to exploit popular discontent, something it has done with some effectiveness in Lebanon, Palestine and, more recently, Iraq - a costly irony for the Americans, since they went into Iraq, in no small part, to neutralise the Iranians, and haven't had quite the effect they wanted.

In effect, the US foreign policy establishment bought the line peddled by Arab governments that it was their way, or the Islamist way. The belief that the only thing separating the Arab world from Islamist theocracy are repressive regimes glosses over the considerable complexity of the Arab world: many of the protesters in the streets of Cairo and Tunis have little interest in Islamism.

Nonetheless, it is safe to say that few of them have any fondness for Israel or, for that matter, the US, which has been seen to be far too cosy with their oppressors. Regardless of how far regime change goes in Egypt, there is a real risk that a key pillar of American and Israeli foreign policy has been shaken. Though it will not become hostile, Egypt will probably become a less reliable ally.

That will further bolster Iran's position as the key anti-Israel and anti-American player in the region. Moreover, Tehran will capitalise on the hostility Arab governments feel towards Iran: Iran will be able to say that it sides with the people against oppressive regimes.

Regional counterweight

Nonetheless, that won't mean Arab popular revolts will underpin the rise of Iran as the regional counterweight it seeks to be. Arab hostility towards Iran runs deep, and Sunni fundamentalism differs greatly from Iran's Shi'ite fundamentalism (even though the two have managed to find common ground of sorts in Palestine's Hamas movement).

But it does mean that Israel will be more exposed, and the US slightly less influential. Moreover, the Americans - and the West, more generally - will watch anxiously to see if popular protests spread further east, to their allies in the Gulf states. Were the princes and emirs threatened by popular revolts, the impact on world oil prices and, thereby, on the world economy, could be deep indeed.

For now, the Obama administration has made a calculated gamble: siding with the street against Egyptian President Mubarak. Whether this wins approval from ordinary Egyptians remains to be seen, but it can't have pleased the existing Egyptian establishment.

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