WikiLeaking - What to make of the diplomatic cables

Colin Steer, Editor - Sunday Gleaner

There has been a bit of an unsophisticated response to The Gleaner's publishing of material, obtained via the non-profit whistle-blower entity, WikiLeaks, which the US Embassy in Kingston describes as "alleged cables that purport to include classified information".

First, an aside. Despite the understandable refusal by the embassy to comment on the veracity of the material, many people will have little reason to question the authenticity of these "alleged cables". For one thing, at the time they were first released overseas last year, there was much concern in US government circles about the publishing of the "private comments" of envoys about countries with which they had diplomatic relationships, and there were furtive attempts to suppress them. It would also be quite a superhuman effort to create so extensive a trove of bogus material purportedly coming from US missions across the globe.

So the public can assume they are authentic.

More important for us locally, however, is that the reading public needs to distinguish between analyses or assessments that are simply opinions, and reports that may be grounded in hard facts. Some of the analyses may be of no more value than radio newscasts that frequently begin: "Political analysts Lloyd B. Smith and Shalman Scott say blah, blah, blah." On the other hand, if the reports sent back to Washington are based on credible intelligence and surveillance even, they make for interesting analysis as to how the country, its people, public officials (not only politicians), security personnel and private business persons are viewed by representatives of the leading world power. Equally important, even if the assessments and perceptions are flawed, they will no doubt help to formulate policy positions with, and on, Jamaica.

One should not assume, either, that these cables constitute the sum total of the "intelligence" that embassy personnel have on Jamaica and Jamaicans. In all probability, there are yet higher levels of assessment which have not reached WikiLeaks.

So what have we learnt from what has been published on the WikiLeaks website so far? First, the publications should disabuse some people of their apparent naïveté that diplomats are sent to countries simply to disburse financial aid, cut ribbons, oblige with an appearance at an important function, and smile for the social pages of the newspapers. They all have (not just the Americans) a mandate to gather information on host countries and to file reports back home that will serve the short- and long-term interests of their respective governments.

In that regard, the published material on the WikiLeaks website does not suggest a preference for, or a bias against, any of Jamaica's political parties or personalities. Rather, we read assessments of how individuals are perceived and what the analysts and some of their informants have to say about them. Note, for example, that when someone described as a confidant of the then national security minister, Dr Peter Phillips, reportedly met with embassy personnel in the run-up to the leadership contest in the People's National Party set for February 25, 2006, that this person suggested "that Dr Phillips believes he has the support of the US embassy".

The cable narrative described this as a "sly aside", and added that the said confidant was told that embassy personnel had indeed worked closely with Dr Phillips on security and law-enforcement issues, and appreciated his "pragmatism and willingness to cooperate". However, it was pointed out to the confidant that the embassy had also worked well with Phillips' rivals (Portia Simpson Miller and Omar Davies), although a little less, given their portfolio responsibilities. That is just another way of saying a vulgar attempt to curry-favour was seen for what it was.

No prior hostility

Also, despite the pressure that the Jamaica Labour Party government later came under for its handling of the Christopher 'Dudus' Coke extradition affair, there is no indication that the US had any prior hostility towards it. An analysis sent ahead of the September 2007 general election said of the JLP:

"A JLP victory would represent a sea change in Jamaica's political direction. As outlined ... across a broad spectrum of issues - from Venezuela and Cuba to trade liberalisation, market-driven development, anti-corruption efforts, and Iraq - the fundamental orientation of the JLP is more consonant with US policies than that of the current Government."

The cable noted, too, that in private discussions (with embassy personnel), Golding and other JLP officials had stated that, upon taking power, they would look to the US for advice and assistance in areas as diverse as:

harnessing remittances to boost economic

• development;
  
• biofuels;
  
• expansion of microfinance;
  
• reform, clean-up, and training/equipping of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF);
  
• financing infrastructure development.

This prompted a recommendation from the embassy in Kingston for a favourable hearing despite what was seen as unrealistic high expectations on the part of the JLP.

"In short, the expectations of a newly elected JLP Government would be high; the US might well have difficulty meeting them.

"Washington should accommodate, to the extent possible, Golding's request for a visit ... to discuss areas of potential cooperation, and begin thinking about what sort of response we would be able to make to a request for enhanced engagement by a more US-oriented JLP Government, should that come to pass."

That would not have been an unreasonable assessment given the JLP's past ideological posturings. But on the assumption of office and the absence of clear thinking and political will to deal specifically with the niggling Coke "extradition problem", a chill seemed to have enveloped the relationship.

Other notes on the JLP before and after the elections were that "Golding's own party leadership and the JLP's political supporters are not without their own bad apples". One party functionary was said to be "involved in unspecified criminal activity, according to the local UK High Commission."

Christopher Coke was also described as a known drug don, "who has been a financial backer of the JLP". Golding was also reported as expressing the wish to remove tainted individuals from involvement in the JLP. "However, to do so, he needs more than just rumours. He has approached the embassy in the past for information on suspect individuals. How the (US) would be able to assist Golding with evidence of wrongdoing on the part of party members and/or supporters bears consideration."

The conclusion of that specific assessment was that "Golding understands that the missing piece is not necessarily resources; it is political will. During his campaign, as well as in his inaugural address, he promised that his Government would have the political will to tackle crime, violence, and corruption. These assertions now will be tested severely."

Well, given the events of the past year and a half, would anyone quarrel with that analysis?

But lest supporters of the People's National Party get too smug, published cables have identified persons in its ranks as being "corrupt", "suspect", and being involved with "illicit activities" and associated with "criminal elements". Some of them are still operating in different parts of the island as activists and are in the running for parliamentary seats. What is the likely scenario if any of these persons were to be elected in the next election or remain influential in the party? Will there be pressure on a new PNP government, should it win, to weed out its bad elements?

WIDESPREAD POLICE CORRUPTION

On perceived police corruption, one of the embassy's officers, after meeting with the Police (Civilian) Oversight Authority, was asked to give his assessment of the level of corruption in the JCF. The response? "Corruption is widespread and the JCF does not meet international standards in terms of professionalism, as well as the level of corruption." Hundreds of thousands of Jamaicans could endorse that.

The comment on a senior police officer in early 2007 was that "he is known to be corrupt, and ... will, along with other members of the JCF, do all they can, including participating in extrajudicial killings of witnesses and intimidation of their fellow officers," to prevent investigators from making progress.

Some of the material which predates this Government's term in office points to frustration over the PNP's failure to deal with corruption and persons believed to be involved in narco-trafficking. One cable refers to a senior civil servant as having problems with a subordinate in a government department that has long been identified as a hotbed of corruption. Attempts were made to shift the subordinate. The senior public official was told "people kill people for things like these". This was interpreted as a direct threat, and a report was later made to senior police personnel. In the long run, the senior civil servant reportedly "came under enormous pressure" from several government ministers to leave the subordinate alone, and the status quo remained.

The main lesson to be drawn from these exposés is that Jamaica has been, and will continue to be, under the special scrutiny of the US, Canadian and UK governments, and among which there is information-sharing. Knowing what they know, claim to know or have been advised, their policy positions on Jamaica for the next few years may not be as cordial as they have been in the past, whichever party forms the next government. Interesting times lie ahead.

The views expressed in this column are personal and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of The Gleaner's editorial or corporate management. Feedback may be sent to columns@gleanerjm.com.