Campaign finance reform

By Peter Espeut

In the more than 20 years I have been writing this column, one of my major interests has been the interface between the private sector and our politicians.

It takes cash to run political parties and political campaigns, and politicians turn to the private sector for donations. This provides the perfect opportunity for influence peddling, and the dispensing of political favours in terms of contracts, permits, waivers and exemptions.

A mature democracy regulates what takes place at this interface, and promotes transparency, accountability and integrity.

Last August, the Electoral Commission of Jamaica (ECJ) issued revised recommendations for campaign finance reform, "after consideration of the comments and opinions of members of the House of Representatives and Senate as expressed in debate" (front cover). It is a document every Jamaican concerned about political corruption should read carefully, taking note of what is said, and what is not said.

The document recognises what you and I know: that corrupt politicians and private-sector donors will try their best to circumvent whatever reform measures are put in place: "The emerging wisdom on campaign financing is that there is no perfect or permanent legislation that can be formulated. Whatever measures are put in place, efforts will be made to circumvent them and to find loopholes, thus requiring new measures to be put in place subsequently. Prudence demands that acceptable, workable and effective measures are enacted subject to appropriate adjustments in the future." (page 8).

Therefore, it is wise to think of all the possible loopholes before the legislation is passed, and to plug them to make political corruption harder.

Right throughout the report, what is not clear to me is what is to be made public and what is to be kept secret by the ECJ. For example, the following is an "impermissible donor", and is "banned from making donations to campaigns for political office": "Private companies performing a public service pursuant to a contract the value of which exceeds an amount of $500,000 with a government body or public office, whether as principals or subcontractors, in circumstances where such contracts came into force within a period of two years prior to, or within a period of two years subsequent to, the making of a donation unless full disclosure of such contract is made to the Electoral Commission at the time of the making of such a donation" (page 10).

Of course, the punchline is in the last part: "unless full disclosure of such contract is made to the Electoral Commission". The ECJ is not an anti-corruption agency, charged with making linkages between donations given and favours received. Keeping the declarations by these private companies secret by the ECJ may not assist, then, in achieving their objective, which they state as: "to minimise or regulate influence peddling, as well as obviate the possibility of the State and its policies being hijacked and dictated by narrow interest groups". Transparency will only be served if all these declarations are made public, which is not proposed by the August 2013 revised recommendations.

In the section on 'Disclosure of Candidates and Political Parties', these disclosures are all made to the ECJ, and nothing is said about the commission making the disclosures public:

"At the end of the campaign period, every political party and every candidate contesting an election shall submit separately to the Electoral Commission/director of elections a consolidated report, in the prescribed form, detailing all contributions/donations received and expenditure incurred within the campaign period. In addition, every candidate shall submit to the Electoral Commission a declaration in the prescribed form."

A draft of the "prescribed form" is not given in the August 2013 recommendations, so we don't know whether the names of the donors are required. We need to see a draft of the "prescribed form".

But what about groups named 'Friends of (So-and-So)', and '(So-and-So) our candidate", and 'Constituency Development Trusts', and the like. Do they have to declare their income and what they spend? Almost every candidate has a campaign manager, and several agents who campaign for them. Do all these campaign managers and agents also have to declare their income and what they spend? How will the ECJ know that all the (secret) agents have made their declarations, and have declared everything?

And if the ECJ keeps the declarations secret, the public, who may know some of the (secret) agents, will never be in a position to expose them.

It seems to me that the revised recommendations are little better than the original ones: too opaque for my liking, and not accountable enough.

More next week.

Peter Espeut is a sociologist. Email feedback to columns@gleanerjm.com.