Sensible move with Iran deal

Ian Boyne, Contributor

"There is no such thing as a conflict which cannot be ended ... conflicts are created, conducted and sustained by human beings. They can be ended by human beings." - - former American Middle East envoy George Mitchell

The breakthrough with that deal on the Iranian nuclear programme represents a triumph for diplomacy and negotiation. If certain interests had their way, we would be contemplating American strikes in both Syria and Iran. In both cases, diplomacy (so far) has won over death.

But the hawks are still unsettled. Indeed, they are hopping mad. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the deal "a historic mistake". Some call this deal Obama's Munich. The right-wing Weekly Standard published a piece by John Bolton charging that the Obama administration was guilty of "abject surrender".

Junior Republican senator for the state of Texas, Ted Cruz, in a piece on the Foreign Policy magazine website titled 'A Dangerous, Wrong-headed Deal', says, "The mullahs in Tehran can now laugh all the way to the bank while they spend the time and money they have gained in Geneva pursuing nuclear capability. And all Americans have bought for $7 billion is the prospect of additional negotiations that might result in progress at some point down the road ... the administration has got it backwards, and it is time to reverse course before any further damage is done".

It is not only Israeli and American hawks who are unhappy with the deal struck with Iran by the P 5 plus 1 Group (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, as well as the European Union). Saudi Arabia, America's closest Arab allay in the Middle East, is upset at any prospect of improved US-Iran relations because it fears Iran as a regional competitor and has sectarian differences with its Shi'ite administration. Saudi Arabia would disagree with any kind of agreement with Iran, irrespective of its elements.

For it is true that a possible US-Iran rapprochement would significantly alter geopolitics in the Middle East and affect alliances. But the major question which has to be faced is, what are the realistic options for resolving the US-Iran imbroglio? What options are viable? It is not a matter of what is most desirable, but what is most achievable. This is what the issue comes down to.

President Obama pointed out the important elements of the new deal in his address, announcing it on Saturday night: "For the first time in nearly a decade, we have halted the progress of the Iranian nuclear programme and key parts of the programme will be rolled back. Iran has committed to halting certain levels of enrichment and neutralising part of its stockpile. Iran cannot use its next-generation centrifuges - which are used for enriching uranium. Iran cannot install or start up new centrifuges and its production of centrifuges will be limited. Iran will halt work at its plutonium reactor. And new inspections will provide extensive access to Iran's nuclear facilities and allow the international community to verify whether Iran is keeping its commitments."

These are significant concessions. It's an interim deal. But it's a start, and it is better to start with this limited deal than to wait for a comprehensive deal which might not come at one time. This gradualist approach is the low-hanging fruit.

Fareed Zakaria, in his article in Time magazine slated for its December 9 edition, makes a lot of sense. He says, "The opposition to the new agreement on Iran's nuclear programme is predictable but still puzzling. Here's what would have happened had there been no deal: Iran would have continued to build up its nuclear programme with no constraints or inspections." In 2003, Iran approached the US to broker a deal. The Bush administration rebuffed Tehran. Bush felt sanctions would do it, that the regime would cave under, so there was no need for concessions. It's what Zakaria calls a "collapse or capitulation" view. Neither has happened in all these 10 years.

Instead, Zakaria points out while in 2003, Iran had 160 centrifuges; today it boasts 19,000. What number will it reach if there was no deal with Iran? And the military option has been, time and time again, demonstrated to be the worst one. To see why that is so, I recommend Georgetown University's Colin Kahl's article, 'No time to attack Iran', in the March/April 2012 issue of Foreign Affairs, and the Centre for New American Security's paper Upheaval: Policy Toward Iran in a Changing Middle East (June 2011).

Strike won't work

Even the conservative Economist magazine, in its February 25, 2012, edition, 'Why an attack on Iran will not eradicate the nuclear threat', admits that while "Iran armed with a bomb would pose a deep threat, military action is not the solution to a nuclear Iran. It could retaliate, including with rocket attacks on Israel from its client groups in Lebanon and Gaza. Terror cells around the world might strike Jewish and American targets."

Logistically, Iran's sites are spread out and not easily identifiable, and some of them would demand repeated hits. "Any war with Iran would be a messy and extraordinarily violent affair, with significant causalities and consequences."

Professor Kahl says, in his Foreign Affairs piece, "A US attack would also likely to rally domestic Iranian support around nuclear hardliners, increasing the odds that Iran would emerge from a strike even more committed to building the bomb."

And The Center for New American Security policy paper says: "The military option should be rejected barring some dramatic new Iranian move toward rapid weaponisation. The benefits are limited, the costs potentially high, the risks of escalation significant and the impact on America's broader portfolio of global interests severe. A military strike will not provide a certain end to the nuclear programme either. Any strategy will leave a degree of uncertainty and risk. To do more would require an invasion and regime change, and even war hawks insist this is not on the table because of its costs and risks. The military does not have the deployable forces, nor does the American public have the appetite for an occupation of Iran."

Let's be realistic: Whether we see Iran as part of an evil Muslim empire or not, let us admit what is practicable. Professor Colin Kahl has an engaging paper, Inflection Point: Requirements for an Enduring Diplomatic Solution to the Iranian Nuclear Challenge just published (November 2013) by the Center for New American Security. It demonstrates with the clearest precision the foolhardiness of the hawks' position on Iran.

First, the view that sanctions are enough to cause collapse or capitulation of the Iranian regime is misguided. Sanctions have helped to bring Iran to the table, but escalating them would not guarantee regime change. Don't underplay the role of Russia and China in bringing about this deal. Russia and China had previously blocked attempts to punish Iran and have only agreed for additional pressure and sanctions on Iran because of Iran's intransigence. If Iran had shown a willingness to use diplomacy and the US had spurned that, as it did in 2003, the US could not count on these two powerful countries to continue to apply sanctions and back its hard line against Iran.

Iran used to sanctions

So the sanctions themselves would begin to fray if the US had decided not to use diplomacy. Plus, Iran is accustomed to years of sanctions and punishment. It endured eight years of war with Iraq. Sanctions are not turning the Iranian people against their regime. A recent Gallup poll showed that only 19 per cent of the Iranian public holds the regime responsible for the hardships caused by the sanctions, while 46 per cent blame the United States. Some 68 per cent of Iranians support their country's nuclear programme. And even opponents of the regime are in favour of Iran's nuclear programme. There is national consensus over an Iranian nuclear programme (not to be confused necessarily with getting the bomb).

So any wholesale opposition to nuclearisation by the US would not be supported by the Iranian people. Iran has already spent more than US$100 billion over decades and expended much political capital on its nuclear programme. It is not just going to abandon it totally - even in the face of sanctions. The election of moderate President Rouhani who, in 2003 was Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, opens up the possibility for meaningful dialogue.

Kahl says in his paper that "on closer examination, the proposed interim agreement is very much in the interest of the United States and the US's closest allies, including Israel. It would halt and roll back the most troubling aspects of the Iranian programme. By stopping 20 per cent enrichment and, significantly, reducing Iran's stockpile of 20 per cent material, it would immediately address the very threat Netanyahu highlighted in his 'red line' speech to the United Nations General Assembly last year."

This interim deal is a good start. At least Iran is at the table and it is always better to talk with one's enemies than be isolated from them. For a study of how historic enemies have become friends, I recommend noted Professor Charles Kupchan's 2010 book How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace.

On this Iran deal, Professor Kahl concludes well in his paper:  "Lawmakers (in Congress) should resist the temptation to insist on an optimal but unachievable agreement. If we are to avoid the worst possible outcomes - unconstrained Iran nuclearisation or another major war in the Middle East - then a good if imperfect deal is clearly preferable to no deal at all."

Ian Boyne is a veteran journalist. Email feedback to columns@gleanerjm.com and ianboyne1@yahoo.com.