The UTech saga - Accountability, equity and trust

This article is contributed by the Caribbean Leadership Re-imagination Initiative. The Initiative is chaired by Dr Canute Thompson and the director is Nadeen Spence.

The public has a right to know the full story of what has been taking place at the University of Technology (UTech) in relation to issues of governance, expenditure of public funds, adherence to procurement rules, equity, and trust.

In our opinion, the leadership of the various unions (UAWU, UTASA, UTASU) must be commended (not criticised or condemned) for bringing to the attention of the Government and the public their concerns (with supportive facts). It is an undisputed fact that the leadership of UTech consists not just of the council, the president and his vice-presidents, but every head of department, every lecturer, every ancillary supervisor, and every person with an area of responsibility is part of the leadership.

The levels of responsibility and accountability may differ based on assignment to rank or seniority, but even if not recognised, leadership responsibility is diffused. It would, therefore, be a dereliction of duty on the part of the leadership, generally, if those leaders who became aware of problems remained silent.

The advocacy and resolve of the middle to lower levels of leadership at UTech in bringing to public attention their observations and concerns about governance should inspire us as a nation that there remain among us people with the courage and will to do what they believe is the right thing to do.

The Principle and Practice of Collective Leadership

Some will remember the 1986 Challenger space shuttle disaster. That shuttle was blown apart within seven minutes after take-off because of the dripping of oil on to a combustible area. The oil drip was caused by a loose screw. All seven people on board perished. The commission of inquiry set up by former President Ronald Reagan found that some members of the team knew about the problem, but kept silent for two main reasons:

(a) They feared that speaking could be interpreted as seeking to expose their 'superiors'.

(b) The NASA culture was intolerant of 'errors'.

The lesson here is this: Had people in less-senior positions who knew of a problem exercised the courage of going against the grain of what is normal, then a disaster might have been avoided.

Ben W. Heineman, in a Harvard Business Review blog on March 20, 2014, expounds on this issue of collective leadership. His piece is titled 'The Crisis Management Lesson from Toyota and GM': "It's Our Problem the Moment We Hear about It."

In this blog, Heineman argues that delay in confronting crises is deadly. He contends that corporate leadership requires the creation of processes for learning of important problems before they become catastrophic for the organisation. The most important assertion Heineman makes is that the mantra for all leaders in crisis management must be: "It is our problem the moment we hear about it. We will be judged from that instant forward for everything we do - and don't do."

In the case of Toyota, it has cost the company US$1.2 billion and counting because of the failure of people who knew of safety problems from years before to speak out. GM has had to recall 1.6 million vehicles because of the same failure. Had the middle- and lower-level managers and leaders at UTech kept silent in the face of what they knew, they would have been guilty of dereliction of their duties.

One of the questions that the report of the Heaven Task Force raises, in our view, is the issue of equity. The question is simply this: "If less-senior members of the leadership had made the decisions that the senior leadership is reported to have made, would the senior leadership handle the matter in the same way they appear to be expecting that their alleged errors are being handled?" Put another way, would the senior leadership not issue suspension or mandatory leave notices if less-senior leaders were accused of similar actions as those of which they are accused?

Actual/Perceived Inequity

One of the major destroyers of trust is actual or perceived inequity. This assertion is almost a truism. If a child feels her parents treat her less favourably than the parents treat her siblings, that child will begin to lose trust in her parents. The same is true of students in a classroom and, of course, of employees in the workplace.

When employer-employee trust is eroded, one or more of four things become inevitable: (1) persons pull into their shell and adopt a survival mode; (2) people look over their shoulders to see what the next act (attack) is going to be; (3) people look out to find the earliest and most convenient exit; or (4) people form alliances to defend themselves. In the process, the organisation suffers, and what is playing out at UTech shows signs of the consequences of inequity-induced mistrust.

Balancing The Scales

None of the statements issued by either the unions or the management of UTech suggest that a path forward has been found. The comments of the president that staff can call for whatever they wish are statements that we are sure the learned professor will wish to withdraw in a more sober moment. The suggestion by Dr Orville Taylor that the unions are acting like bullies is one that we think Dr Taylor may wish to review. The suggestion by the unions that the performance of the UTech council is "poor" is one that, on the surface, appears a little too generalised and one that they, too, may wish to reconsider.

The absence of commentary on this matter from organisations like the Jamaica Civil Society Coalition (JCSC) is strange given its commitment to the promotion of accountability on the part of public officials. UTech is a public entity and receives taxpayers' money. We doubt that if an elected official or senior civil servant were accused of the things of which the management of UTech is accused that JCSC would have remained silent.

This may well be another manifestation of inequity. In the absence of a clear agenda of accountability and transparency, the call by the council for all the parties to come together is not likely to begin the process of healing, restoration and trust-building.

We are of the view that a more credible healing and restorative process would involve the stepping aside of members of senior management who have been implicated in the various actions complained about and detailed in the Heaven Report, and an interim president who would not be eligible to compete for appointment be assigned to lead the healing process and lead the search for a new president.

Given that the Office of the Contractor General and the Auditor General's Department have been called in, we further propose that the other senior leaders would remain on leave (while others act in their positions) until the results of the probes are known and appropriate action taken in keeping with the veritable findings of the reports.

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