EDITORIAL - Crimea: the dilemma of inconsistency

In global politics, principle tends to be fluid and morality relative - a fact patently obvious in the squabble between Russia and the West over the future of the autonomous Ukrainian region of Crimea.

Some dates from a quarter-century ago may be useful: September 26, 1990; December 23, 1990; May 2, 1991; September 8, 1991; February 29, 1992. Those were the days on which referenda were held, respectively, in Kosovo, then an autonomous region of Serbia, and the other Yugoslav republics - Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovena - to legitimise their planned secession from the Yugoslav federation.

Six years ago, 13 years after the Balkan wars, Kosovo, operating under the protection of the United Nations but still officially part of Serbia, declared its independence. It was recognised by, among others, the United States, Britain, Germany, France and Italy.

On Sunday, the ethnic Russian-dominated legislature in Crimea plans a referendum to determine whether people want again to become part of Russia - which they were up to 60 years ago - or remain with Ukraine, with more autonomy. The United States, Britain, Germany and France insist the referendum would be illegal, breaching international law and the Ukrainian constitution - a grab by Moscow for Ukrainian territory, where it harbours its Black Sea fleet.

This newspaper does not question the morality of the West's support two decades ago for the movements that caused the collapse of the Yugoslav federation, or its defeat by Milosevic's nasty ethnic wars. In the circumstance, though, it is not unreasonable to ask our friends and partners what constitutes the ultimate in democratic expression and where, at this time, a plebiscite falls in the spectrum of democracy.

At the same time, the Crimean crisis, and Moscow's military intervention, have to be viewed against the overthrow in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, of President Viktor Yanukovych by demonstrators who rejected his decision to put on hold an association agreement with the European Union (EU) in favour of closer ties with Russia.

The politics of bankruptcy

Mr Yanukovych may have been corrupt, but he was a democratically elected leader whose decision on the EU was not unthinking. Ukraine and Russia have long historical ties. Their economies are deeply integrated. Ukraine is also strategically important to Russia.

Ukraine is bankrupt. Its association pact with the EU would have meant delinking its economy from Russia's. It would have to undertake tough market-related reforms, but without upfront financial cushion from the EU. When Russia offered Yanukovych US$15 billion and further gas subsidies to shore up his economy, the EU declared itself not in a bidding match. Mr Yanukovych grabbed Moscow's offer.

The upshot was his overthrow. Moscow calls it an unconstitutional coup. The West sees the actions as legitimate.

Ethnic Russians in Crimea, fanned by Moscow, feel uneasy. The Kremlin feels geopolitically threatened. It sees the prospect of NATO moving closer to its borders and presenting a threat to its naval bases in Crimea. Or, as some have put it, for Russia, it's like the US having potentially hostile governments on its borders in Mexico and Canada.

Crimea's referendum, and the grabbing of government offices, are not totally unlike what took place in Kiev. The referendum is a toxic mix of geopolitics and fomented calls for self-determination. The West, as they say, is finding that the shoe is now on the other foot. And they don't like how it feels.

The opinions on this page, except for the above, do not necessarily reflect the views of The Gleaner. To respond to a Gleaner editorial, email us: editor@gleanerjm.com or fax: 922-6223. Responses should be no longer than 400 words. Not all responses will be published.