Jalil Dabdoub | ‘Joke ting’ governance

Jamaica has a governance problem that cannot be ignored. The State repeatedly passes laws without first constructing the legal, institutional, physical and constitutional infrastructure necessary to sustain them. This habit has produced congestion, inefficiency, and frustration in the past. It is a mode of operating that has caused the country to fail to achieve sustained growth and improved quality of life for Jamaicans.

The National Identification and Registration Act to implement the National Identification System (NIDS) is a recent example. The first passing of the act failed because the State attempted to grant itself sweeping powers over citizens’ personal data without first establishing the constitutional safeguards required in a democratic society.

Rather than build a robust data-protection regime, independent oversight mechanisms, and clear limits on executive discretion, the Government legislated and spent money first and asked constitutional questions later. That reflects a deeper culture of performative governance and of scant regard for democratic rights and institutions. It is a culture that permeates through both political parties that have held the reins of government at some time or another.

At its core, NIDS sought to normalise mass data collection by the State without adequate protections for privacy, proportionality, and consent. The Constitutional Court made clear that such a system cannot exist in a vacuum. A modern identification regime requires more than efficiency claims. It requires enforceable rights, independent supervision, data minimisation, transparency, and meaningful remedies for abuse. None of these were sufficiently embedded in the legislative architecture. The state attempted to expand its power before proving it could respect constitutional rights.

Beyond its constitutional flaws, NIDS also represents a staggering policy contradiction. The system has already cost the country significant public funds, yet it is not mandatory. In practical terms, this means that after years of expenditure on technology, administration, legal battles and public rollout, there is no guarantee that more than a small fraction of Jamaicans will ever use it. A national identification system that is voluntary, distrusted, and legally constrained raises a fundamental question of value.

If uptake remains low, NIDS risks becoming an expensive parallel system to existing forms of identification rather than replacing them. This is inefficiency and fiscal imprudence. Public money is being spent to build a system that lacks both legal legitimacy and universal utility.

THE REVERSE

The more sensible and democratic approach would have been the reverse. Instead of spending millions first and asking constitutional questions later, the State should have invested in the supporting infrastructure: strong data-protection legislation, an independent privacy authority, clear limits on data use, judicial oversight, and transparent accountability mechanisms. With those safeguards in place, public trust could have been earned, and universal participation would have followed. A system designed to protect citizens would not need to coerce them. It would be widely and willingly adopted.

Historically, successive Jamaican governments have favoured symbolic legislation over the essential “invisible work” of institutional readiness. A primary example is the 1990s liberalisation of the US dollar, where exchange controls were dismantled before the Bank of Jamaica possessed the necessary regulatory or supervisory infrastructure. This lack of oversight and risk management led to systemic instability, culminating in a massive financial collapse and the subsequent creation of FINSAC to absorb private losses. Ultimately, prioritising liberalisation before institutional preparation resulted in deep public debt and a lasting erosion of public trust.

Similarly, the decision to allow large-scale importation of used motor vehicles was taken without corresponding investment in road infrastructure, traffic enforcement, or urban planning. The policy expanded access, but the State failed to build the physical and administrative infrastructure needed to absorb the impact. Congestion, road deterioration, and enforcement breakdown were treated as unfortunate side effects rather than foreseeable outcomes of poor planning.

JUSTICE SYSTEM

Even within the justice system, this pattern is present. In 2013, the jurisdictional monetary limit of the Parish Court was raised to $1 million without any commensurate increase in judges, clerks, courtrooms, or technological support. The reform was presented as improving access to justice. In reality, it placed additional strain on an already underresourced system, slowing case resolution, and deepening backlogs.

NIDS fits squarely within this tradition but with a crucial difference. Unlike traffic congestion or court delays, constitutional breaches cannot be patched over administratively. When the state undermines fundamental rights, privacy, and dignity, it damages the very framework that legitimises governance. The Constitution is not an obstacle to efficiency. It is the condition that makes lawful governance possible.

What is particularly troubling is the political response to the court’s ruling. Rather than treat the judgment as a warning about overreach and poor planning, there has been a tendency to frame constitutional safeguards as hurdles to overcome. This mindset is dangerous. It suggests that rights are inconveniences and that legality is something to be retrofitted after power has already been claimed.

This is the essence of performative politics or as we say in Jamaica ‘joke ting’: enacting legislation while eroding away the foundations that make it legitimate or failing to put in place the necessary support infrastructure for the legislation to be effective. A true national identification system would begin not with data collection but with constitutional design such as strong privacy laws, independent regulators, judicial oversight, and clear limits on use. It would build trust through compliance with constitutional law before demanding compliance.

Jamaica’s problem is not reform itself. It is the belief that reform begins and ends with legislation. Until we abandon this habit of governing by announcement and start governing by a long-term vision that appreciates infrastructure, whether physical, institutional, or constitutional, we will continue to produce laws that fail, systems that collapse, and rights that must be rescued by the courts.

NIDS is one of the examples, which is part of an ongoing crisis. Whether we heed it will determine whether future reforms strengthen Jamaica’s democracy or erode it.

Jalil S. Dabdoub is an attorney-at-law. Send feedback to columns@gleanerjm.com.