Hardley Lewin | Missteps in funding national security

INTRODUCTION

The Andrew Holness-led administration never misses an opportunity to remind the country that no previous administration has made the massive investment in national security as they have done since assuming the reins of Government. This is a fact, and they have every reason to shout it out from the highest hills.

The Government of Jamaica ought to be commended. The massive financial allocations to national security were obviously designed to bring crime under control, a major campaign promise of the Holness administration.

It is to be noted that while some investments will take a little while to show the expected results, it is reasonable to ask after some seven years: “What is the return on investment from this major spend on national security?”

This would be difficult to quantify in percentage terms, at least for me anyway, but we can agree if we were to classify the ROI as disappointing, and for some, very disappointing.

Why so?

I have raised before my lack of understanding as to the reasons for the massive investment in a major expansion of the military, the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF), as opposed to our primary law enforcement and crime-fighting agency, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). I could not and still cannot see what strategic intelligence analysis could have informed the size and shape of the military force that we have built and continue to build out. And even if justified by a realistic analysis of the threats, why the rush?

Why the rush if it meant denying the JCF access to and acquisition of valuable tools and accessories which would directly impact crime prevention and crime-fighting. These include but are not limited to increased manpower, mobility and appropriate technologies.

Make no mistake, these are all areas that have received and continue to receive attention from the administration, but if we really want to solve crime, which I have no doubt we do, then our efforts are woefully short of what is required.

So, what could we have done differently to achieve this?

REALLOCATION OF FUNDING

The JDF has received many new barrack blocks and administrative buildings to provide for the rapid increase in size of the force.

If the JDF had received four fewer buildings, these structures could have provided four modern purpose-built remand centres – one each in the north, south, east and west of the Jamaica.

Then we could remove all remandees from police lock ups and house them in proper remand centres, which would be manned by the correctional services. In other words, get the police out of guarding lock-ups and put them back into core policing functions, on the streets.

The JDF has received eight new helicopters (not including training helicopters) and five of six patrol boats. Would six helicopters and four patrol boats not be enough, at least for now? The savings from two helicopters and two patrol boats amount to roughly US$40 million.

With this US$40m directed to the JCF and high impact crime-fighting tools, here is a sample shopping list:

Jamaica Eye: This project, I understand, is at best, fledgling. We could have had a more fulsome rollout of this critical crime prevention, crime-solving tool. The first aim of policing is to prevent crime through deterrence. Where deterrence fails, CCTV is a major tool in detecting and solving crime, yet this project seems to be merely ambling along.

Vehicles: Many of our stations do not have adequate numbers of vehicles. Consider a rural station that serves up to five, 10, 15 satellite communities having only one service vehicle. In these circumstances, policing is reduced to being reactive rather than being proactive. The first duty of the police is to deter or prevent crime. To deter they must be out there on the frontline being seen and felt; presence is essential.

Communications: Do the police as yet have a modern communications network, complete with personal two-way radios? If not, why not? The sight of police officers relying on personal cell phones for communications is unacceptable.

Police stations: While major efforts are being made to refurbish existing police stations, I would posit the view that many of them should be replaced by new purpose-built stations. Our policemen and policewomen deserve better and we need to design and build standard police stations. The last time this happened was during the period of the late 1800s, early 1900s.

Boots on the ground: It is well recognised that the police force has been woefully short of the numbers needed to carry out more effective policing. While efforts are being made to address this issue, I do not get the feeling that the matter is being treated with the urgency it deserves.

Graduating 1,500 new constables and losing 300-500 per year is not an acceptable net gain given the urgency of our crime problem. This is a matter I have written about before that I will address comprehensively in a subsequent article.

Body-worn cameras: This is a requirement that has been lingering for some time and we should get on with it and equip at least those officers on planned operations and other duties where they come into close contact with the public. The police need the help and cooperation of citizens to deter and solve crime and the citizens need the police to keep them safe. This interdependence between citizens and their police can be greatly strengthened when there is greater trust and confidence between the parties.

These are but some of the big-ticket items that could have been addressed in a more meaningful way, and if addressed we would have seen a greater and more sustained reduction in crime.

The ‘Selection and Maintenance of the Aim’ is the first principle of war. We were led to believe that we had declared war on crime but our actions and allocations following the declaration are out of sync. Wars must be funded, with the allocations skilfully applied to ensure the results reflect the maximum “bangs for the bucks”. In this regard we have failed.

We must also apply the other principles of war appropriate to our circumstances – viz, economy of effort, offensive action, maintenance of morale, security, surprise, flexibility, cooperation and administration.

Our efforts to reduce crime and violence and antisocial behaviour will not be greatly helped by merely imposing stiffer penalties, SOEs, ZOSOs, ESMs, preventive detentions and other coercive strategies.

And neither will they be helped by spin, smoke and mirrors, and public relations. The truth will come to light.

The citizens of Jamaica have a role to play but first we must understand that governance cannot be left up to the governors, any more than security can be left up to the security forces.

FINALLY

This quote from a military précis which I have adapted to our circumstances is instructive:

“Security forces successes alone will not stamp out the threats to security; they may drive it deeper underground or force the criminal elements to allow their activities to lie dormant for a period. The only sure way is to remove the conditions which stimulated criminality in the first place.

There should be a joint politico-security forces aim, namely, to afford protection against criminal elements while at the same time raising the standard of living, improving health and educational facilities, engendering faith in democratically elected government by demonstrating justice and fair-play and generally by winning the support of the people.

No amount of foreign interference or assistance short of complete domination will remedy a deteriorated internal security situation unless the people concerned take action for themselves. A well-defined security aim is vital but success on the security side will be useless unless the complementary political aim is achieved. The cause, not just the effect, of the problem must be removed.”

I say to my fellow Jamaicans “awake from your slumber”, and regardless of what you feel about our political class, you must participate in the political process.

It starts by getting yourselves enumerated and voting for the political party of your choice when the time comes and by whatsoever yardstick you use to make your decision.

Now, it does not end there. Always BE AWARE and BEWARE of what decisions are made in your name.

Rear Admiral (Rtd) Hardley Lewin served for 36 years in the Jamaica Defence Force, the last five as its Chief of Staff. He went on to serve as Commissioner of Police of the Jamaica Constabulary Force for two years. Send feedback to columns@gleanerjm.com