Mubarak's departure leaves big shoes to fill

Dennis Morrison, Contributor

Last Friday's massive turnout of protesters demanding the end of the Mubarak regime's 30-year rule appeared to have swung the tide in their favour after mid-week violent confrontation provoked by supporters of the Egyptian president. As the struggle intensified, there were also glimpses of possible shifts within the regime that could lead some elements to separate themselves. This would fit with speculation that the Obama administration is hard at work fashioning a coalition of military and civic figures to lead a transitional government in Egypt.

For Americans, the Egyptian uprising is the most recent case where they have had to scamper to catch up with dramatic political changes unfolding at a rapid pace. History shows how in the late 20th century, they misjudged the reach and depth of protest movements that led eventually to the dislodging of long-standing regimes in Iran, the Philippines, and Indonesia. They had cast their lot completely with autocratic regimes on which they relied to enforce political stability, with the consequence that they were disconnected from the democratic impulses within these countries and the forces that could lead to change.

To paraphrase former US President John F. Kennedy, in the case of Iran, the despotic shah made a peaceful revolution impossible and a violent overthrow inevitable. Not only did the US lose a valuable ally, but the radical Islamic forces that took power succeeded in establishing a stronghold from which to challenge Western influence in the region. The weight of these radical forces is now being felt in Lebanon, the Gaza, and in post-Saddam Iraq.

political stability

It is in these circumstances that Egypt, under Mubarak, emerged as a strategic American ally, serving as a bulwark of political stability in the region. For the past three decades, it has been a counterforce to Arab militancy in the Gulf region, a collaborator with Israel in reining in radical Palestinian forces (Hamas), and a broker in peace initiatives. Above all, Egypt has served as a key point in the logistical support system for America's military activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Preoccupied with their strategic interests in their dealings with Egypt, Americans invested little in fostering relations with the forces demanding democracy and human rights and must now hastily stitch together alliances to preserve their influence.

While Western commentary on the unfolding events has emphasised the absence of strong anti-American sentiments, is there a risk that the backlash against the repressive Mubarak regime could ultimately feed such sentiments? Would the displacement of the regime necessarily open the door to the spread of extremist politics in the Persian Gulf region? The fear, based on the Iranian case, is that the removal of the stabilising influence of Mubarak will inevitably throw Egypt into the arms of radical Islamist forces.

Though late, the Obama administration seems to have come down on the side of opinion that the best hope for America to retain relevance is if it sides with the voices in Egypt that are demanding democracy, freedom, and justice. This is mostly a secular society and a theocratic agenda is nowhere evident in the rhetoric of the protest movement. And the Muslim Brotherhood, the best organised opposition force in the country, is a minority group.

danger of contagion

The risk of contagion of extremist politics in North Africa and the Persian Gulf can be minimised not by resisting regime change in Egypt, but by pursuing an activist policy to reform unpopular and repressive regimes in these states. Kingdoms and autocracies in the oil-rich states of the region have been shielded by the Americans and Western Europeans for decades, and have also relied on Egyptian influence to temper the growing sway of the Shi'ites. Having been caught off guard in Egypt, America should press these allies to move ahead of the tide as the best means of counteracting the danger of contagion.

The scramble to shuffle governments in Jordan and elsewhere suggests that the message is spreading, but the risk of contagion may be more worrisome in the big oil producers like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia is the world's second-largest oil producer, with massive reserves. It alone accounts for about 12.0 per cent of global production and the other three producers represent a further 12.0 per cent.

Political instability in these countries would, therefore, have severe consequences for oil prices and the global economy. Hence, the question of how long Saudi Arabia can escape the winds of political change must now be of more serious concern. Does the reaction from the kingdom to the demands for Mubarak's removal from power suggest that its rulers believe they can continue to resist change?

For Israel, the most exposed nation to the risk of Arab radicalism, regime change in Egypt will likely disrupt the predictable relations it enjoyed with that neighbour for 32 years. So it may be opposed to the ouster of Mubarak. The stability gave Israel maximum leverage to put off serious negotiations with the Palestinians in recent years and fed intransigence on the part of Israeli leaders. They would be wise to recalibrate their strategies and make a concerted effort to reach a settlement with moderate Palestinians lest any chance of a lasting peace be undercut by the changing political landscape.

Dennis Morrison is an economist. Email feedback to columns@gleanerjm.com.