Clashing with Margaret on Grenada

The recent passing of one of the greatest political leaders of the 20th century was a shock to all who knew of her powerful leadership. Her policies were transformational, redirecting global political thinking and empowering the call for action.

Her mission was a supreme belief in the force of the market and the power of the individual driven by reward for initiative. She reshaped the British economy, pulling it back from the edge of a cliff and promoted other ways to offer social benefits than to rely on welfare.

She was a controversial figure, which led her to meet resistance along the way. Two such instances of confrontation directly between myself and Prime Minister Thatcher will illustrate. These were about the Grenada intervention and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, as set out below:

The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) convened an emergency session to discuss ways of ending the anarchy and violence in Grenada. Acting under Clause 8 of the OECS Treaty of 1981, the members voted to ask Barbados, Jamaica and the United States to join them in sending a multinational peacekeeping expedition to Grenada. Hours later, at 2 o'clock in the morning of October 22, Sir Paul Scoon, the governor general of Grenada, by letter, asked the OECS, Jamaica, Barbados and the United States to free his country from the Revolutionary Military Council.

I had made it clear that Jamaica would not act without a request in writing from the governor general, the constitutional authority. In a letter addressed to me, dated October 24, 1983, Sir Paul Scoon wrote:

"You are aware that there is a vacuum of authority in Grenada following the killing of the prime minister and the subsequent serious violations of human rights and bloodshed. I am, therefore, seriously concerned over the lack of internal security in Grenada. Consequently, I am requesting your help to assist me in stabilising this grave and dangerous situation. It is my desire that a peacekeeping force should be established in Grenada to facilitate a rapid return to peace and tranquillity and also a return to democratic rule."

This letter would absolve Jamaica from violating the sovereign rights of Grenada by landing armed forces without approval.

REAGAN'S ORDER

With requests for intervention in hand, President Ronald Reagan instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States to prepare a military expedition to seize Grenada from local military forces. Teams of SEALs would go ashore after midnight on October 24 to reconnoitre beach conditions at Point Salines and Pearls. By dawn of October 25, a battalion landing team with air cover from the USS Independence would move by helicopter to objectives at Point Salines airfield and the St George's Medical School landing strip. However, there was great concern that the Rangers or Marines might prompt the Grenadians or Cubans to kill the students or hold them hostage.

At 6 p.m. on October 24, President Reagan gave the order for a US expeditionary force to land in Grenada and seize control from the revolutionary forces. There was concern that the Cuban workers at the airport could resist the US landing and inflict significant casualties against US forces. It was just prior to giving the order that Reagan called Margaret Thatcher, the British prime minister, to advise her of the intervention.

Thatcher was unhappy for more than one reason. Grenada was part of the Commonwealth and problems in this sphere should be left for the British to solve. Further, in the British view (shared by many countries), the intervention was in violation of Grenadian sovereignty. The Caribbean was concerned that if the British were informed, they would try to stop the intervention and, thus, in the circumstances, concurred with Reagan's decision to delay informing Thatcher. This peremptory decision caused some political fallout in the debate in the House of Commons, which the Conservative leaders had to use their political skills to control.

Since Jamaican troops would be involved, I was advised secretly that the landing would take place on Tuesday morning, October 25. I reported that transportation would be needed. Troops from the Jamaica Defence Force were dispatched to the airport to await transport after Governor General Sir Florizel Glasspole had given constitutional approval for Jamaican troops to be involved in external military combat.

When dawn broke on October 25, 500 American paratroopers were landing. An airborne attack was the first wave of landing. Radio Free Grenada broadcasted a frantic appeal to the people to defend their country against the American invaders. The people stayed indoors. Most of the Grenadian troops, now faced with battle, dumped their uniforms in the field and escaped.

BRITTLE DEFENCE

The only real defence came from the 550 Cubans building the airport, who turned out to be soldiers. Fidel Castro issued a statement that Cubans would never surrender. They fought bravely but soon after Castro called on them to offer no further resistance, for which I publicly voiced my appreciation.

Members of the Central Committee were rounded up and imprisoned, all except General Austin (the chairman), who went into hiding. He was found by the American troops on October 31, six days after the intervention.

Casualties were 12 Cubans, three civilians and eight American military personnel killed. The military action was over before noon.

Another battle of a different type now had to be fought. There was widespread condemnation internationally. Leftist allies, led by Guyana and Nicaragua, protested at the UN. Margaret Thatcher, who was apparently upset that the Americans had intervened in a former British colony without fully bringing her into the picture, ondemned the action. I told her she was "shooting from the hip".

India and France protested, but none of these countries asked for any supporting reasons to justify the intervention. They were unaware of the events leading up to the death of Bishop or the call by the governor general for intervention to restore peace and order, which constitutionally legitimised the intervention. Their interpretation was that the United States was breaching the sovereignty of Grenada by attacking it as an ideological partner of Cuba.

The dissenters, of course, were not aware of the evidence that Grenada was being armed to assist the Marxist cells in the region to create insurrections. In fact, Grenada had received one round of ammunition for every person in the entire English-speaking Caribbean and enough weapons to arm the defence forces of all the countries.

The documentary evidence on the Military Treaties was not found until more than a week after the intervention. Likewise, the contents of the minutes of the Central Committee were unknown to the critics until that time.

When I released the information in Parliament on November 14, it must have caused much rethinking, except among committed socialists. This was apparent from a letter received from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, November 10, responding to my letter to her of October 26 in which I set out clearly the reasons why the military intervention in Grenada was necessary. This was after the matter was debated in the House of Commons led by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. That debate was noted for its lack of intimate knowledge of what was taking place in Grenada under the Bishop government and the threat this was posing to the OECS. But it was revealing in the information provided which showed the British government:

Taking a position that political and economic measures were what should be considered instead of intervention;

Refusing to condemn the US and other intervention countries for the step they took;

Indicating that Britain was not invited by Grenada to join the interventionist forces, which would have been rejected;

Regretting that in spite of a telephone call between Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan, the night before the intervention, in which the president promised to advise her if he was going ahead with intervention, he did not do so.

Margaret Thatcher, in her letter, expressed her position as being "as sad as anyone else that this difference arose between us. But I believe we must now look to the future." Her principal interest was, as in our own case, the restoration of constitutional democracy and to assist in that respect. Britain would resume "bilateral aid and relationship with Grenada which involved capital ... as well as technical cooperation".

Now that she has passed on, time will judge her contribution no doubt, but history cannot deny her eminence in global politics.

Edward Seaga is a former prime minister. He is now chancellor of UTech and a distinguished fellow at the UWI. Email feedback to columns@gleanerjm.com and odf@uwimona.edu.jm.