Egypt's coup

By John Rapley

The first thing that occurred to me was: Who brought the fireworks? As upwards of a million Egyptians filled the streets of Cairo to celebrate the military's overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, a spectacular pyrotechnic display lit up Tahrir Square, the heart of Egypt's revolution. Egyptians don't strike me as the sort of people who just happen to carry expensive fireworks with them wherever they go in the event a celebration erupts. The revelry seemed as well-planned as the coup.

Certainly, the coup was effectively implemented. Troops surrounded key buildings, shut down Islamist television stations, and quickly rounded up the key leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, the party of the deposed president. The next day, an interim president was sworn in. What had started as a youth street protest had mushroomed into a massive popular expression of opposition to the president.

Egypt's opposition is highly fragmented and has been electorally ineffective. But they can agree on what they dislike, and they disliked Mr Morsi a lot. Many felt he had betrayed the revolution begun in Cairo's Tahrir Square two years ago.

Morsi did himself no favours in the way he governed. Early on, he seemed to have gained control of the military by installing a seemingly more pliant leadership. But he was not happy to stop there, and seemed to spend most of his time in office attempting to expand both his and the Brotherhood's power.

In his final days in power, the military ramped up the pressure, telling him if he didn't reach out to the opposition, the generals would take over. But that removed any incentive the opposition had to cooperate with Morsi. They filled the streets and awaited the outcome. But in rallying to support the military coup, they chose to focus on the 'liberal' part of liberal democracy. They may come to regret that decision.

There is now considerable anxiety that Egypt might descend into the sort of vicious civil war its neighbour Algeria suffered in the 1990s, after the military dissolved elections that were going to install an Islamist government there. The coup will feed the sense of victimhood the Muslim Brotherhood has always felt, and will underscore the claims of more radical Islamists that the democratic path to power will always be denied them. Moreover, with secularists, Salafi Muslims and Christians supporting the army, Egypt's divided family may start feuding.

Brutal crackdowns

On the other hand, the lessons of Algeria had been digested. Egypt's Islamists in the past had suffered their own brutal crackdowns by the military, and don't want to repeat the experience - least of all one that, as in Algeria, ends in their defeat. Moreover, in the short term, Egypt's Islamists may fragment, and the Brotherhood may prefer to right its own house.

Part of the Brotherhood's problem was that it never really effected the transition from being a rather secretive, tightly run opposition movement to being a governing party. Its approach tended to be exclusionary, and it couldn't help seeing opponents as enemies.

So more insightful voices in the organisation may call for the elevation of a new generation of leaders who can build bridges to Egypt's other factions, including secularists and religious minorities.

The Muslim Brotherhood's future orientation may be determined, in no small part, by what the military does next. If the round-up of its leaders was merely a precautionary measure to ensure they didn't try to start a rebellion, and they soon return to public life, a compromise may yet be possible. If it was the start of something more sinister, Egypt's future looks decidedly more shaky.

But there can be no doubt that even if Egypt avoids outright civil war, it is entering an uncertain period. Its society is polarised and its democracy has just suffered a body blow. The economy goes from bad to worse as the unemployment rises, basic commodities grow scarce, and the country's foreign reserves dwindle.

And they probably still have to pay the bill for the fireworks.

John Rapley, a political economist at the University of Cambridge, is currently on a visiting professorship at Queen's University in Canada. Email feedback to columns@gleanerjm.com and jr603@cam.ac.uk.